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The Effect on Stockholder’s Wealth on Critical Systems Failure and Remedy: The Boeing
787 Case.
Jayendra Gokhale1, Sunder Raghavan1 and Victor J. Tremblay2
KEYWORDS: Event Study, Aerospace Industry, Stock Returns.
CLASSIFICATION: Airline Economics, Aviation Case Study, Air Transport Policy and
Regulation.
In this paper we analyze the effect of Boeing Dreamliner 787’s battery problems on stockholder
wealth. Using the event study methodology, we show that the recall in January of 2013 initially
caused the company’s cumulative abnormal returns to fall by almost 4% in four trading days
after the recall. This was followed by an announcement by two major airlines to ground all of the
787 Dreamliner jets. The FAA also ordered all US airlines to ground their 787s and announced
an investigation to review all critical systems of 787s. However within four months of the
investigation, FAA approved Boeing’s revisions to its 787 design. This caused Boeing’s
abnormal returns to rise by almost 2%. On April 24th Boeing reported it’s greater than expected
quarterly results which caused its abnormal returns to rise by an additional 3%. The Boeing case
provides us an opportunity to study how critical mistakes can change the value of a
manufacturer. It also shows how critical it is for the company to redeem itself by quickly
addressing a crisis situation.
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I.

Introduction

There is documented research that product harm crises and product recalls damage the value
of a firm. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Hoffer, Pruitt and Reilly (1987) found evidence of
negative effect of recalls by automobile firms on stock returns. Gokhale et al. (2014) find
evidence of negative stock market reaction to recalls made by Toyota in 2010 due to its sticky
accelerator pedal. In this study we study the stock market reaction to the reports of fire in battery
unit of several Boeing 787 Dreamliners, subsequent groundings and investigation by the FAA
and its effect on Boeing’s financials.
The Boeing 787 has faced several operational problems and aviation incidents since its
rollout in 2007. The CEO of Boeing Mr. James McNerney described as those similar with the
rollout of new models of passenger airplanes. Among the many problems that it faced, the
Boeing 787’s main problem has been a problem with its battery. In January of 2013, there were
reports of fire in the fuel cell compartment of an empty 787 operated by Japan Airlines (JAL).
This was followed by similar reports by All Nippon Airways (ANA), United Airlines (UAL),
Ethiopian Airlines. The FAA announced a comprehensive review of all critical process of the
787 Dreamliner. All 787s were grounded and Boeing halted the deliveries of new 787s until a fix
to battery problems was found.
While looking at product harm crises, an individual event may not be as interesting or
significant for a firm’s revenues in the short run. However if the event is life threatening such as
the sticky accelerator pedal (Gokhale et al. 2014) or a fire in the battery unit of an aircraft can
have a serious effect on the reputation of the firm. In this paper we analyze the financial impact
of the Dreamliner groundings made by Boeing due to battery problems. Just like the sticky
accelerator pedal problem with Toyota, this problem was due to reasons internal to the company.
Several prior studies investigate the relationship between stock returns of companies and
catastrophic events such as airline crashes (Barrett et al. 1987; Davidson et al. 1987) and the
September 11 terrorist attacks (Carter and Simkins 2004; Guzhva 2008). However, this
investigation differs from these earlier studies because of the nature of firm involvement
(external versus internal).
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Following the groundings, Boeing worked on a fix to resolve the battery issue. They
addressed the fix in three ways (Sinnett 2013). First they made manufacturing improvements by
enhancing battery construction process and quality control. Second, they made changes to the
engineering design of the battery. Third, they added an enclosure to the battery unit. After
working with the FAA, Boeing got a clearance from the FAA on April 19, 2013 that their
proposed modifications would make the Dreamliner airworthy. The following week, on April
23rd Boeing reported better than expected financial results even after the groundings negatively
affected the company image. Thus the Boeing case provides us with an excellent opportunity to
study three distinct events around the 787 Dreamliner groundings. The first event is a series of
instances of fires reported by different airlines operating the Dreamliner. The second is the
clearance by the FAA, an independent government organization regarding the safety of the
Dreamliner. The third is the announcement of financial results by the company following the
events.
We use the event study methodology to estimate the effect on Boeing’s stock returns due
to the battery fire and groundings. We want to see if these events have an impact on the value of
the firm given the sensitive nature of the product being involved (an aircraft) and if the clearance
by the FAA can reverse the damage to the company reputation if any caused by the problem. Our
results indicate that the investors felt that the problem was major and that following the clearance
by the FAA, Boeing had indeed settled the problem. The investors were positively surprised by
Boeing’s financial results that followed which showed that notwithstanding the battery problems,
the firm had done a remarkable job of damage control to its reputation. This paper is organized
as follows. Section II describes a timeline of the events. Section III describes the event study
method. Section IV describes data and empirical results. Section V concludes.
II. Boeing and the Dreamliner battery problems in 2013
The Dreamliner has faced several problems both before and since its first delivery in late
2011. Its first customer was All Nippon Airways with an order of 50 aircraft and a scheduled
delivery of 2007. However, several testing delays and clearances caused the company to make its
first delivery of the aircraft in September 2011. A few glitches and errors related to engines were
subsequently corrected through 2012. However on January 7, 2013 a fire broke out in an empty
JAL Dreamliner in Boston. The next day there was report of a fuel leak on a JAL Dreamliner. On
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January 9, UAL reported problem with wiring near the battery of one of its 787. The National
Transportation Security Board (NTSB) announced the launch of an investigation. On January 11
and 13, two JAL Dreamliners were found to have fuel leaks. On January 16, an ANA Dreamliner
reported having a battery fire and was diverted in the middle of its flight and grounded.
Consequently all Dreamliners in operation at the time were grounded until further investigation.
Boeing also announced that deliveries would be halted until battery problem was solved.
III.

Event Study Analysis

We use the event study method to investigate the effect of the circumstances related to the
battery problems on returns of Boeing stock. The event study method was developed by Ball and
Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969).1 The event study technique is a common method used to
study effect of manufacturing shortcomings and product recalls. Some examples of application
of the event study method in the airline sector include studies by Ceshney et al. (2011), Liu et al.
(2013), Jayanti and Jayanti (2009), Mizuno and Hanabusa (2011). The event study approach is
based on the assumption that returns from a stock are driven by the returns from the broad
market ceteris paribus. This is captured in the market model, which is based on the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis which assumes the price of a stock reflects all currently available
information in the marketplace. More specifically, the return of a stock i at time t (R ), is
expressed as a function of market information. This market information is typically measured as
the return on a portfolio of stocks (R

). These include the Dow Jones Industrial Average

(DJIA), the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500) etc. In the market model,

is expressed

as:
R

α

βR

ε ,

(1)

where, ε ~ N 0, σ ,
ε , the error term is assumed to follow a random walk. If all available information is captured in
the stock returns through market return relationship as captured by the efficient markets
hypothesis, expected value of

1

is zero.

For more recent reviews of this method, see Thomson (1985), Armitage (1995), MacKinlay (1997),
Bhagat and Romano (2002a, 2002b) and Corrado (2011).
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The goal of this study is to test the null hypothesis that an abnormal event such as safety issue
with an airplane has no effect on the manufacturing company’s expected returns. Thus we define
abnormal return as the difference of ex post return and the normal expected return, which is
conditioned on the situation that the abnormal safety event never took place. To be precise, the
abnormal return (AR) for firm i at event date τ is
AR

R

E R |R

,
will be

In case of the market model

E R |R

(2)

is the expected return and R

information). In other words, R

is the market return (which is the conditioning

is the information that is used to predict expected returns

assuming no abnormal event.
In the event study method, the relation between
window. This allows us to estimate the sample value of

and
and

is measured in the estimation
. Let Wpre be the length of the

estimation window and Tpre be the number of observations in the estimation window. The value
of Tpre needs to be sufficiently long and yet should not include any abnormal events, which may
cause the estimates

and

to be unstable. Let Wevent be the length of the event window, which

starts at =0. This is before the official start of the event if there are fears of information leakage.
The length of Wevent is > 1 if there are inefficiencies in transmission of information to investors,
or if the event studied is a complex series of smaller events. In such a case,

extends through

several trading days.
Using the estimated values of αi and βi from Wpre, we can estimate abnormal returns and
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). CARs aggregate abnormal returns over the event window.
If an event does not have an impact on returns, then ARs (and hence CARs) would not be
statistically significant. A negative (positive) event would produce negative (positive) ARs and
CARs.
If Wevent ranges from τ1 to τ2, then
CAR

∑

AR .

(5)
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In addition to the market model, we also estimate ARs using the Fama French 3-Factor
model and the 4-Factor model. In the three factor model, there are two additional regressors.
SMB (the variable ‘Small minus Big’) – which represents the anomalies that occur due to the
size difference of firms and HML (the variable High minus Low) which occurs due to some
stock being more growth oriented vis-à-vis value oriented stocks (in today’s world stocks such as
Tesla can be perceived as growth stocks while Apple, IBM etc. can be perceived as value
stocks).
R

α

βR

β

SMB

β

HML

ε

(6)

In yet another specification, we augment the 3-factor model by a momentum factor
(MOMmt) on winners and losers for the market in addition to SMBmt, HMLmt and Rmt. This is
based on the theory that stocks which have price momentum in their favor (for example due to
consistent earnings beat) tend to outperform stocks which do not have momentum.
R

α

βR

β

SMB

β

HML

β

MOM

ε

(7)

To account for risk, we also employ the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which uses the correlation
of riskiness of a stock to the riskiness of the market to predict AR and CAR. This model uses risk
free rate (the interest rate on the 1-month treasury bill) in the equation below,
R
IV.

R

β R

R

ε

(8)

Data and Estimation Techniques

The data consists of returns from Boeing Stock and that from the S&P 500 Index obtained from
the Center for Research in Security Prices available from the Wharton Research Data Services
from the University of Pennsylvania. We use estimation period window of 250 days preceding
the first event (battery fire in 787 at Boston’s Logan International Airport). We study the
following events:
Event 1:

January 7, 2013 Fire breaks out in empty 787 JAL Dreamliner in Boston

Event 2:

January 8, 2013 A 787 JAL Dreamliner suffers a fuel leak and flight out of
Boston
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Event 3:

January 11, 2013 FAA announces a comprehensive review of all critical
systems of Boeing 787

Event 4:

January 16, 2013 battery fire detected in an airborne ANA flight from Ube
to Tokyo. All Boeing 787s were grounded and delivery of new 787s was
halted until a resolution of the issue was found.

Event 5:

April 19, 2013 FAA approves the battery design fix proposed by Boeing

Event 6:

April 24, 2013, Boeing announces better than expected quarterly financial
results

We test for robustness of the results using a 90-day and a 180-day window and find that
results are consistent across the three estimation windows. We use a 50-day estimation window
for events during April of 2013. However, the 50-day estimation window for events 5 and 6 does
not guarantee loss of contamination from the previous events. So we use the 250 day estimation
window used in Events 1 through 4 for these events as well. We use a single day event window
because some these events are spaced very closely. All events except the clearance by the FAA
are unanticipated. Table 1 presents a summary of different estimation and event windows used.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of data used for regression. Table 3 presents results of
regression and OLS parameter estimates. There is a positive and significant association between
Boeing returns and market returns. These parameter estimates are then used to generate expected
returns and abnormal returns from each event. To analyze if abnormal return associated with
each event is significantly different from zero, we carried out parametric test. The abnormal
returns and significance calculated using the market model are listed in table 4. We find that the
first event of the fire, produced abnormal returns of -1.7% significant at 5% level. The event next
day of another fire in JAL Dreamliner caused abnormal returns of -2.3% significant at 1% level.
Abnormal returns for the third event of announcement of review of critical systems of 787 by the
FAA were -2.47% significant at 1%. This shows that the markets were getting prepared for the
worst case scenario on the Dreamliner. For the battery fire in airborne ANA flight incident
(Event 4), abnormal returns were -3.37% significant at 1%. For the event in which the FAA
approved battery design fix (Event 5), abnormal returns were 1.3% (significant at 10%). For the
event in which Boeing surprised investors with positive earnings surprise (Event 6), abnormal
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returns were 3.03% significant at 1% level. These results are further corroborated by the 3-factor
model (table 5), the 4-factor model (table 6) and the CAPM model (table 7).2 The abnormal
returns and cumulative abnormal returns for events 1-4 are shown in figure 1 and for events 5
and 6 are as in figure 2.
The empirical results are significant given the fact that events associated with accidents
or reports related to fire produced negative abnormal returns while events related to the fix and
positive earnings surprise produced positive abnormal returns. These are consistent with investor
expectations.
V.

Concluding Remarks

We estimate the extent to which a chain of negative events related to the battery problems
of Boeing Dreamliner affected the returns of Boeing stock. These involve four major reports
associated with battery fire or fuel leak in different Dreamliner aircrafts on different days. This
was followed by grounding of all Dreamliner aircrafts delivered until then by Boeing and
suspension of delivery of new Dreamliners. All these events produced negative abnormal returns.
The FAA announced an investigation of the issue. Boeing created a fix for the problem and the
FAA declared that the fix was good. This was followed by a positive earnings surprise by
Boeing. Both these events produced positive abnormal returns.
This evidence supports two main conclusions. The reports of accidents made the
investors nervous about the financial impact on Boeing’s financial value. Clearance of the fix by
the FAA exonerated the company of its previous design flaw and reassured the investors that the
problem had been solved. The announcement of financial results by the company further
reassured the investors that the company had tackled the issue successfully despite the
groundings and non-delivery of new aircraft. This case provides an excellent opportunity to
study how a company can successfully navigate product harm crisis.

2

We also considered a smaller estimation window of 55 days (after events 1 – 4) for events 5 and 6 and found that
the ARs for events 5 and 6 were still robust but significance levels dropped.
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Table 1 Description of Estimation and Event Windows
Estimation/ Event
Window

Dates

Estimation Window

01/03/2012
to 01/02/2013

Brief Description
251 trading days in the previous year

Event 1

01/07/2013

Fire breaks out in empty 787 JAL Dreamliner in Boston

Event 2

01/08/2013

A 787 JAL Dreamliner suffers a fuel leak

Event 3

01/13/2013

Fuel leak in another JAL 787 Dreamliner

Event 4

01/16/2013

Battery fire detected in an airborne ANA flight from
Ube to Tokyo. All Boeing 787s grounded and delivery
of new 787s halted until resolution of the issue.

Event 5

04/19/2013

FAA approval for the battery design fix proposed by
Boeing

Event 6

04/24/2013

Better than expected quarterly results announced by
Boeing

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Description

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

(×102)

(×102)

(×102)

(×102)

Rit

Returns from Boeing stock

251

0.0362

1.1788

-3.6213

5.2862

Rmt

Returns from S&P 500 Index

251

0.0635

0.8178

-2.4643

2.5403

Table 3 Regression Results from Estimation Period
Coefficient

Std. Error

t-statistic

P> |t|

Intercept

-0.0003

0.00054

-00.51

0.609

Rmt

+1.0031

0.06560

+15.29

0.000
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Table 4 Abnormal return (AR), standard error of abnormal returns (SAR) and p-value of
abnormal returns (PSAR) for 6 events related to Boeing Battery Problems using

the

market

model
Date

Event Number

AR (×102)

SAR

PSAR

1/7/2013

Event 1

-1.6673**

-1.9606

0.026

1/8/2013

Event 2

-2.2744***

-2.6746

0.004

1/11/2013

Event 3

-2.4713***

-2.9073

0.002

1/16/2013

Event 4

-3.3716***

-3.9665

0.000

4/19/2013

Event 5

+1.2765*

+1.4987

0.068

4/24/2013

Event 6

+3.0321***

+3.5671

0.000

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Table 5 Abnormal return (AR), standard error of abnormal returns (SAR) and p-value of
abnormal returns (PSAR) for 6 events related to Boeing Battery Problems using
model
Date

Event Number

AR (×102)

SAR

PSAR

1/7/2013

Event 1

-1.8515**

-2.2063

0.014

1/8/2013

Event 2

-2.2715***

-2.7067

0.004

1/11/2013

Event 3

-2.6427***

-3.1503

0.001

1/16/2013

Event 4

-3.3183***

-3.9665

0.000

4/19/2013

Event 5

+1.3342*

+1.5873

0.057

4/24/2013

Event 6

+3.4926***

+4.1635

0.000

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

the

3-factor
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Table 6 Abnormal return (AR), standard error of abnormal returns (SAR) and p-value of
abnormal returns (PSAR) for 6 events related to Boeing Battery Problems using

the

4-factor

model
Date

Event Number

AR (×102)

SAR

PSAR

1/7/2013

Event 1

-1.8636**

-2.2176

0.014

1/8/2013

Event 2

-2.2293***

-2.6526

0.004

1/11/2013

Event 3

-2.6646***

-3.1721

0.001

1/16/2013

Event 4

-3.3077***

-3.9376

0.000

4/19/2013

Event 5

+1.4274**

+1.6958

0.046

4/24/2013

Event 6

+3.4766***

+4.1387

0.000

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Table 7 Abnormal return (AR), standard error of abnormal returns (SAR) and p-value of
abnormal returns (PSAR) for 6 events related to Boeing Battery Problems using
model
Date

Event Number

AR (×102)

SAR

PSAR

1/7/2013

Event 1

-1.6673**

-1.9606

0.026

1/8/2013

Event 2

-2.2744***

-2.6746

0.004

1/11/2013

Event 3

-2.4713***

-2.9073

0.002

1/16/2013

Event 4

-3.3716***

-3.9665

0.000

4/19/2013

Event 5

+1.2765*

+1.4987

0.068

4/24/2013

Event 6

+3.0321***

+3.5671

0.000

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

the

CAPM
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Figure 1 Abnormal Returns (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for Boeing for
events 1 to 4
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Figure 2 Abnormal Returns (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for Boeing for
events 5 and 6
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